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This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature and 
consequences of the corporate governance problem, providing some guidance on the 
major points of consensus and dissent among researchers on this issue. Also analysed 
is the effectiveness of a set of external and internal disciplining mechanisms in 
providing a solution for the corporate governance problem. Apart from this, particular 
emphases are given to the special conflicts arising from the relationship between 
managers and shareholders in companies with large ownership diffusion, the issue of 
managerial entrenchment and the link between firm value and corporate governance. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Recent financial scandals associated to accounting and other frauds allegedly blamed 
to top company managers (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia) have brought into public 
light the recurring question of whether companies are managed on the best interests of 
shareholders and other company stakeholders such as workers, creditors and the 
general community. A point that has been made frequently is that top managers may 
possess too much power inside their companies and that a general lack of 
accountability and control of their activities is prevalent in companies with wide 
ownership diffusion. 
 
Although this kind of scandals is certainly not new, there has been a renewed interest 
on the mechanisms that can effectively curtail managerial discretion over sensitive 
company issues that can have an impact on the welfare of the remaining stakeholders. 
At the same, time, and especially after some well publicised company failures in the 
late 80s / early 90s (Polly Peck, Coloroll, Maxwell Communications, BCCI), 
numerous sets of recommendations on corporate governance issues have been 
published worldwide and adopted, in particular, by many stock market regulators since 
the seminal Cadbury (1992) report in the UK. This has given place to a considerable 
amount of research on the effectiveness of these recommendations in providing better 
company governance. 
 
This paper attempts to provide a survey on the fast-growing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the corporate governance problem, providing some guidance on the major 
points of consensus and dissent among researchers regarding the nature and effects of 
the conflicts of interest between managers and other stakeholders, and on the   3
effectiveness of the set of available external and internal disciplining mechanisms. A 
particular emphasis will be given to the special conflicts arising from the relationship 
between managers and shareholders in companies with large ownership diffusion. 
 
2 The corporate governance problem 
 
2.1 Concept of corporate governance 
 
The term “corporate governance” is a relatively new one both in the public and 
academic debates, although the issues it addresses have been around for much longer, 
at least since Berle and Means (1932) and the even earlier Smith (1776). 
 
Zingales (1998) expresses the view that “allocation of ownership, capital structure, 
managerial incentive schemes, takeovers, board of directors, pressure from 
institutional investors, product market competition, labour market competition, 
organisational structure, etc., can all be thought of as institutions that affect the process 
through which quasi-rents are distributed (p. 4)”. He therefore defines “corporate 
governance” as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over 
the quasi-rents generated by a firm (p. 4)”. Williamson (1985) suggests a similar 
definition.  
 
Viewing the corporation as a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, Garvey and 
Swan (1994) assert that “governance determines how the firm’s top decision makers 
(executives) actually administer such contracts (p. 139)”. They also observe that 
governance only matters when such contracts are incomplete, and that a consequence   4
is that executives “no longer resemble the Marshallian entrepreneur (p. 140)”. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance by stating that it “deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment (p.737)”. A similar concept is suggested by Caramanolis-
Cötelli (1995), who regards corporate governance as being determined by the equity 
allocation among insiders (including executives, CEOs, directors or other individual, 
corporate or institutional investors who are affiliated with management) and outside 
investors.  
 
John and Senbet (1998) propose the more comprehensive definition that “corporate 
governance deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders of a corporation exercise 
control over corporate insiders and management such that their interests are protected 
(p. 372)”. They include as stakeholders not just shareholders, but also debtholders and 
even non-financial stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, customers, and other 
interested parties. Hart (1995) closely shares this view as he suggests that “corporate 
governance issues arise in an organisation whenever two conditions are present. First, 
there is an agency problem, or conflict of interest, involving members of the 
organisation – these might be owners, managers, workers or consumers. Second, 
transaction costs are such that this agency problem cannot be dealt with through a 
contract (p. 678)”.  
 
These numerous definitions all share, explicitly or implicitly, some common elements. 
They all refer to the existence of conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders, 
with an emphasis on those arising from the separation of ownership and control   5
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) over the partition of wealth generated by a company. A 
degree of consensus also exists regarding an acknowledgement that such corporate 
governance problem cannot be satisfactorily resolved by complete contracting because 
of significant uncertainty, information asymmetries and contracting costs in the 
relationship between capital providers and insiders1 (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart 
and Moore, 1990, Hart, 1995). And finally, one can be led to the inference that, if such 
a corporate governance problem exists, some mechanisms are needed to control the 
resulting conflicts. The precise way in which those monitoring devices are set up and 
fulfil their role in a particular firm (or organisation) defines the nature and 
characteristics of that firm’s corporate governance. As the following sections show, 
such mechanisms can be external or internal to the company. 
 
There are several basic reasons for the growing interest in corporate governance. In the 
first place, the efficiency of the prevailing governance mechanisms has been 
questioned (see for instance, Jensen, 1993, Miller, 1997 and Porter, 1997). Secondly, 
this debate has intensified following reports about spectacular, high-profile financial 
scandals and business failures (e.g. Polly Peck, BCCI), media allegations of excessive 
executive pay (see for example, Byrne, Grover and Vogel, 19892), the adoption of 
anti-takeover devices by managers of publicly-owned companies and, more recently, a 
number of high visibility accounting frauds allegedly perpetrated by managers (Enron, 
Worldcom). Thirdly, there has been a surge of antitakeover legislation (particularly in 
the US) which has limited the potential disciplining role of takeovers on managers (see 
Bittlingmayer, 2000, for a description of this regulation). And, finally, there has been a 
                                                           
1 As Fama and Jensen (1983) observe, “agency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly 
written and enforced (p. 327)”. 
2 See Byrne (1992) for manager’s counter-arguments over such allegations of excessive pay.   6
considerable amount of debate over comparative corporate governance structures, 
especially between the US, Germany and Japan models (see Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997, for a survey of this debate) and a number of initiatives taken by stock market 
and other authorities with recommendations and disclosure requirements on corporate 
governance issues. 
 
2.2 Fundamental determinants of equity agency problems 
 
As referred above, the major conflict analysed in the context of corporate governance 
is the one between shareholders and managers. The theoretical motives for these 
agency problems are analysed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who develop a theory 
of the ownership structure of a firm. The basis for their analysis is the perspective that 
a corporation is “a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships 
and which is also characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on the 
assets and cash-flows of the organisation which can generally be sold without the 
permission of the other contracting individuals (p. 401)”.  
 
The particular focus of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model is the contract of an 
agency relationship between a principal (the external owner of the firm) and an agent 
(the owner-manager, or entrepreneur). They demonstrate that as the owner-manager’s 
fraction of the equity falls (as more equity is sold to outside investors), the utility-
maximising agent has the incentive to appropriate a larger amount of the corporations’ 
resources in the form of perquisites and to exert less than full effort to create value for 
shareholders. The principal can limit the effects of this divergence of interests by 
incurring monitoring costs to curb the agent’s self-serving behaviour. Monitoring 
expenditures potentially include those related to payments to auditors to inspect the   7
company’s accounts, costs of providing information to financial analysts, rating 
agencies, independent directors on the board and so forth. An alternative is for the 
entrepreneur to credibly bond his behaviour towards a more value-maximising one, by 
incurring what Jensen and Meckling (1976) call bonding costs. Examples of these 
include the retention of a larger than desired equity stake by the agent, or the adoption 
of a riskier than desired compensation plan. Jensen and Meckling (1976) conclude, 
however, that in general there will always be a residual loss. All these agency costs (of 
monitoring, bonding and the residual loss) are borne in their model by the owner-
manager in the sale of equity to external investors. In equilibrium, marginal agency 
costs should equal the marginal benefits of monitoring and bonding (that is, the 
marginal increases in wealth from a reduction in the consumption of perquisites and 
shirking). 
 
Besides the effort (or shirking) and perquisite problems described by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), a further problem is associated with managers having a different 
horizon than shareholders. This is because while firms have an indefinite life, and thus 
its shareholders are concerned with an infinite stream of cash-flows, managers’ 
horizon is usually limited to the cash-flows received during employment. This 
problem is naturally aggravated as managers approach retirement. This can lead 
managers to have a short-term perspective on investments, with a preference for 
projects with quicker cash-flow returns (which are not necessarily value-maximising). 
 
An additional source of conflict between agents and principals is related to different 
risk preferences. As portfolio theory suggests, shareholders eliminate unsystematic 
risk by diversifying their portfolios so they are not concerned with company-specific   8
risk but only with market risk, or the risk associated with market-wide fluctuations of 
stock returns. In contrast, managers are typically not well diversified as a large portion 
of their wealth is tied in their company’s fortunes. This is not just because of direct 
cash-flows received from the firm but also because also their future employment 
prospects are dependent on the survival of the firm, especially if they have a large 
human-specific-capital invested in the company. 
 
A compounding problem to these agency costs is the free-rider issue associated with 
an atomistic dispersion of capital common to most large listed firms3. With a large 
dispersion of capital, individual external shareholders have no incentive to engage in 
managerial monitoring, preferring to free-ride on other actions. Thus, although it may 
be in the interests of the collective group of external owners to engage in actions 
aimed at disciplining management, no single rational individual shareholder will 
undertake such actions. In this context, in the absence of other mechanisms, the 
principal will have some additional discretion to run the corporation in her own 
interests. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that the magnitude of the agency costs can vary 
from firm to firm. Some of the factors that can have an influence on such variation are 
-  the shape of managers’ indifference curves; 
-  the ease with which managers can exercise their own preferences (as opposed to an 
optimal, value-maximising behaviour); 
-  the firm-specific costs of monitoring and bonding activities. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) view these as dependent, among other factors. on such attributes as the 
                                                           
3 See Stiglitz (1985). Grossman and Hart (1980) provide such analysis in a corporate control setting.   9
complexity of geographic dispersion of a corporation’s operations and the 
attractiveness of perquisites available in the firm; 
-  the level of competition in the managerial labour market (when the manager does 
not have a controlling interest4). This can in turn be affected by the level of firm-
specific knowledge accumulated by the manager; 
-  the market for corporate control. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) also show that debt may help to overcome the agency 
costs of equity issues to external owners, although debt can create a different set of 
agency problems (see section 5.5). 
 
 




Following the theoretical arguments on the reasons for conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and managers, a considerable number of studies have found evidence 
suggesting the prevalence and importance of agency conflicts between managers and 
owners associated with the horizon, risk differential, perquisite and shirking problems. 
These findings relate in particular to conflicts of interest over issues of compensation, 
diversification, investment, managerial behaviour during takeovers and the adoption 
of anti-takeover devices. 
 
3.1 Conflicts of interest over compensation 
 
Several studies examine the relationship between managerial compensation and firm 
                                                           
4 This particular observation can be linked to the notion of managerial entrenchment (see section 6).   10
performance and show results consistent with conflicting interests between owners 
and managers. A classic study is that of Jensen and Murphy (1990), who find only a 
weak link between compensation and performance. This is compounded by the 
evidence that managerial wealth is three times more sensitive to asset size than to 
market value, which contradicts Rosen’s (1982) hypothesis that the size-pay 
relationship is due to large firms hiring more able executives. Consistent with a 
divergence between executive’s attitude to compensation policy and shareholders’ 
interests is also Crystal’s (1991) characterisation of the procedures and tactics 
undertaken by some compensation consultants to justify top management raises when 
company performance is weak.  
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) observe that takeover threat has two opposing effects on 
compensation. The first is a competition effect in the market for managers, which 
results in less capability for managers to extract higher wages. The second is a risk 
effect, which leads, in contrast, to increased compensation as higher takeover threat is 
likely to result in an increased probability of firm-specific human capital loss or 
implicitly deferred compensation. This in turn makes managers demand higher pay to 
counterbalance the increased risk. Using a sample of 450 firms, and splitting it into 
two sets (one where managers face both risk and competition effects and one where 
only the competition effect is present5), Agrawal and Knoeber (1998) find evidence 
that, as hypothesised, these two effects are significant. This means that, ceteris 
paribus, a lower takeover threat leads, through the competition effect, to higher pay, 
which is in accordance with the perspective of misalignment of interests between 
shareholders and managers.    11
 
Also, Healy (1985) reports evidence that managers choose income-decreasing or 
increasing accruals so as to maximise the present value of the bonus component of 
their compensation. Using confidential data on executive short-term bonus plans, 
Holtausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
managers manipulate earnings downwards when their bonuses are at their maximum.  
 
3.2 Perquisite consumption 
 
Suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), excessive perquisite consumption is one of 
the classic examples of conflicts of interest between managers and the company’s 
owners.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view, however, this consumption as one of the least costly 
manifestations of such agency problems, as compared to the problems arising from 
empire-building and the pursuit of negative net present-value projects. 
 
Although most evidence on perquisite consumption is anecdotal, some indications 
exist that a recent trend has been the reduction of many of the most potentially 
superfluous aspects of executive perks6. Holland (1995) argues that one of the reasons 
for this more thrifty behaviour by managers is increased shareholder activism. 
 
3.3 Diversification and wealth-decreasing investments 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
5 This is done by isolating the situations where managers are protected by contract from the risk effect   12
Another area where conflicts between shareholders and managers are potentially 
important relates to diversification strategies. Although there are theoretical arguments 
suggesting that diversification has both benefits and costs for shareholders7, existing 
evidence usually favours the costs outweighing the benefits.  
 
Consistent with the assertion that, on average, the costs of diversification are larger 
than the benefits, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996) all find 
results in accordance with corporate diversification being associated with significant 
value losses. Also, Comment and Jarrel (1995) report that increases in corporate focus 
are associated with increases in firm value, while Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) 
document that divestitures frequently follow diversification strategies. 
 
In addition, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997a) find evidence consistent with equity 
agency problems being responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing 
diversification strategies and with market disciplinary forces being behind corporate 
focusing. They find that the level of diversification has a negative relationship either 
with managerial equity ownership or ownership by outside blockholders, and also 
report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control 
threats, financial distress and management turnover. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
of the threat of takeover. 
6 For a survey of executive perquisite consumption of 400 large American companies see Royal (1998).  
7 These benefits can include the creation of internal capital markets without information asymmetries 
(Stein, 1997), tax advantages (Lewellen, 1971, Majd and Myers, 1987) and economies of scope (Teece, 
1980). Costs include those related to agency problems (Jensen, 1986, Stulz, 1990) and associated with 
power struggles between divisions of the same diversified corporation (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). See 
also Weston (1970) and Stulz (1990) for the arguments on the potential benefits and Berger and Ofek 
(1995) on the potential costs.   13
Studying the valuation impact of diversification for samples of German, Japanese and 
British firms, Lins and Servaes (1999) observe significant differences in 
diversification discount8, which are associated with differences in corporate 
governance structures. Specifically, they find that insider ownership concentration 
reduces the diversification discount, although this effect varies according to the 
country in question and, in particular, no evidence of such discount is observed for 
German firms. 
 
Some additional evidence of agency problems can be seen in studies of acquisitions 
and other investments. Many studies show that bidder returns from the announcement 
of acquisitions are negative (see Roll, 1986, for a survey). Consistent with Jensen’s 
(1986) assertion that the worst agency problems occur in firms with poor investment 
opportunities and excess cash, Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991) document that bidder 
returns tend to be the lowest when firms have low Tobin Qs and high cash-flows. 
 
McConnell and Muscarella (1986), on the other hand, find evidence of wealth-
decreasing investments in oil exploration, while Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld 
(1985) show this is especially the case when managers have low ownership stakes. 
 
3.4 Resistance to takeovers 
 
Evidence that target managers typically oppose takeovers is documented by Walking 
and Long (1984), who report such resistance to value-increasing takeovers by 
                                                           
8 This diversification discount is measured on the basis of a valuation ratio computed as the ratio of 
total capital to sales, assets or earnings, and the assignment to a particular business segment of a firm 
the valuation ratio of the median of the single-segment firms that operate in the same industry. The log 
of the ratio of the actual to imputed market value then defines the diversification premium or discount.   14
managers with low ownership stakes. As detailed in the following sections, this 
resistance could, to some extent, be due to the desire to extract a higher price from 
actual or potential bidders. However, the US evidence of post-acquisition performance 
of targets (Healy, Palepu and Ruback, 1992), the characteristics of targets (Palepu, 
1986) and post-takeover management turnover (see section 4.1) suggests otherwise9. 
 
Additionally, several studies show that whenever managers adopt anti-takeover 
devices, shareholders suffer a corresponding reduction in firm value. These devices 
include anti-takeover amendments to corporate charters (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983, 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1988a), poison pills (Ryngaert, 1988, and Malatesta and 
Walkling, 1988), dual-class recapitalisations (Jarrel and Poulsen, 1988b) or defensive 
changes in asset and ownership structure (Dann and DeAngelo, 1988). 
 
In summary, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) interpret the overall evidence on managerial 
resistance to takeovers and wealth effects of antitakeover announcements as 
suggestive that “managers resist takeovers to protect their private benefits of control 




To conclude, the existing evidence strongly suggests that some managerial actions are 
inconsistent with the maximisation of shareholders’ interests. This is particularly the 
case with the existence of a low sensitivity of pay to performance (as compared to 
asset size), the manipulation of earnings to boost compensation, the pursuit of wealth-
                                                           
9 Studies involving evidence from the UK and other European nations do not reach, however, exactly   15
reducing diversification strategies and the adoption of self-serving takeover defences 
by managers.  
 
This is fully consistent with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument that residual 
agency costs can be significantly present even if agents and principals engage in 
monitoring and bonding activities to minimise the problems associated with their 
conflicts of interests. Thus the existence of monitoring mechanisms does not seem to 
preclude the significance of residual agency costs. 
 
The following sections look at a number of external and internal disciplining 
mechanisms that firms may face in their efforts to reduce the underlying agency costs, 
their limitations and applicability to individual firms.  
 
4 External disciplining mechanisms 
 
General external controlling mechanisms that have been addressed in the literature 
include the threat of takeover (Manne, 1965, Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, Grossman and Hart, 1980), competition in product and factor 
markets (Hart, 1983) and the managerial labour market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
Fama, 1980). The following sections describe these and other potential monitoring 
devices. 
 
4.1 Takeover threat 
 
Due to the free rider problem, small shareholders have little incentive to monitor 
                                                                                                                                                                       
the same conclusions as those using US evidence. See section 4.1.   16
management but this problem can potentially be avoided by the use of the takeover 
mechanism. According to this view, if management is inefficient or not acting in 
shareholders’ interests, a "raider" could make a takeover bid, buying the firm at a low 
price, managing it better and eventually selling it back with a profit. A feature of the 
takeover mechanism is that it potentially applies in an indiscriminate way to all 
firms10, whereas the existence of other mechanisms (like debt or dividends) may 
depend on managers’ (or shareholders’) decisions. In support of this perspective, 
Easterbrook and Fishel (1991) and Jensen (1993) regard takeovers in the US as an 
essential corporate governance mechanism to control managers’ discretionary actions. 
The empirical evidence showing that takeovers lead to significant positive price 
impacts11 on the takeover target is consistent with this perspective (although also 
with alternative views, e.g. synergistic gains12).  
 
However, the takeover mechanism is not without problems. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) point out that this mechanism can be undermined if shareholders can free ride 
on the raider’s improvement of the corporation (by refusing to sell their shares) unless 
the corporate charter or law includes exclusionary devices able to deal with this free-
riding problem13. In addition, takeovers involve not just the costs needed to induce 
reluctant shareholders but also search costs, bidding costs and other transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1970) that make takeovers in practice a very expensive solution. 
Therefore, in the presence of this monitoring mechanism alone, managers are free to 
                                                           
10It is in this sense that one may call it a general disciplining mechanism. 
11 See Bittlingmayer (2000) for a recent survey. 
12 For a survey of possible explanations for mergers and acquisitions see Weston, Kwang and Hoag 
(1990). 
13 Grossman and Hart (1980) point out that a takeover bidder may have to pay part of the expected 
benefits of improved performance under his management to target shareholders to motivate them to 
accept the offer.   17
deviate from an optimal performance as long as they don’t cause the firm price to 
decline more than the costs of a takeover. Moreover, in recent years the adoption of 
defensive tactics, corporate charter amendments or even anti-takeover legislation have 
further increased the costs and risks of takeovers, notably in the US14. 
 
Also, takeover corrections of managerial failure have the disadvantage that they are 
ex-post corrections, whereas other mechanisms may be ex-ante or "deterring" 
disciplining devices. As such, when disciplining takeovers occur, it is usually too late 
to avoid the huge direct and indirect costs associated with the effects of past sub-
optimal managerial actions. Thus, in this sense one can argue that the takeover threat 
is a more efficient mechanism than the takeover itself15, although the credibility of 
that threat may require the observation of some hostile takeover activity in the market. 
 
Consistent with the view that takeovers are a source of managerial discipline, Martin 
and McConnell (1991) find evidence of increased management turnover after 
successful takeovers, and more frequent turnover when acquired companies 
previously underperformed their industry. Shivdasani (1993) shows results consistent 
with the view that hostile takeovers provide discipline when internal governance 
mechanisms such as the board of directors fail to control management’s non value-
maximising behaviour. Also, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) document that the 
decrease in takeover activity in the US from 1984-88 to 1989-93 was accompanied by 
a reduction in disciplinary pressure on managers. They show that the relation between 
                                                           
14 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that “the takeover solution practised in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, then, is a very imperfect and politically vulnerable method of concentrating 
ownership (p. 757)”. 
15One should note that the eventual observation of only a small number of disciplining takeovers taking 
place in the marketplace does not by itself prove that the takeover threat mechanism is absent or   18
management turnover and performance is significant only during the period where the 
takeover market was more active.  
 
In most of Continental Europe, with the exception of the UK, hostile takeovers are, 
however, rare.  Franks and Mayer (1994) attribute this fact to the particular structure 
of most European capital markets, characterised by a small number of listed 
companies and a relatively high concentration of ownership as compared to the US 
and UK.  
 
In their analysis of UK takeovers, Franks and Harris (1989) report shareholder wealth 
impacts of takeovers similar to those observed in the US. Kennedy and Limmack 
(1996) analyse the performance of takeover targets in the pre-takeover period and its 
relationship with subsequent CEO turnover and find evidence consistent with 
takeovers acting in the UK as disciplinary mechanisms on managers. They observe 
that CEO turnover tends to increase following takeovers, and that target firms that do 
replace CEOs after takeovers (“disciplinary takeovers”) experience lower returns 
before takeover than other targets. In contrast, Franks and Mayer (1996) reject the 
hypothesis that in the UK hostile takeovers perform a disciplining function. They 
assert that the apparent rejection of hostile bids by target management seems to be 
derived not from managerial entrenchment but from opposition to post-takeover 
redeployment of assets or renegotiation over bid terms. In another UK study, 
Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) present the result that a better previous relative 
performance of bidder over target (measured by their relative market-to-book ratio) is 
a significantly positive influence on target’s abnormal returns surrounding a takeover 
                                                                                                                                                                       
inefficient. The same absence of those transactions would occur if the takeover threat were a perfect 
controlling mechanism which forced all managers to behave in a value-maximising way.   19
bid announcement but a negative one bidder’s returns. This result is not strictly in 
accordance with a disciplinary perspective of takeovers where value enhancements 
would be expected to occur for both targets and bidders. Sudarsanam, Holl and 
Salami (1996) interpret their evidence, instead, as consistent with Roll’s (1986) 
hypothesis that bidder managers may suffer from “hubris” that leads them to 
overestimate the benefits of a takeover and pay excessive takeover premia. The UK 




4.2 Product-market competition 
 
Hart (1983) presents a formal model where managerial slack is lower under 
competition than when the manager’s firm is a single non-profit maximising 
monopolistic firm. This suggests that the level of competition in product and factor 
markets may also act as general constraint on the manager’s non-wealth maximisation 
behaviour. However, as Jensen (1986) observes, "product and factor market 
disciplinary forces are often weaker in new activities and activities that involve 
substantial economic rents or quasi-rents (p. 323)”. Jensen (1986) concludes that in 
these cases alternative monitoring mechanisms would become more relevant.  
 
Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), although recognising that product market 
competition may be a powerful force toward economic efficiency, are “sceptical that it 
alone can solve the problem of corporate governance (p. 738)”. 
 
 
4.3 Managerial labour market and mutual monitoring by managers 
   20
Fama (1980) argues that "each manager has a stake in the performance of the 
managers above and below him and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of 
monitoring in both directions (p. 293)”. This is related to the view that the managerial 
labour market may use the performance of the firm to determine each manager’s 
opportunity wage. Additionally, each manager may sense that her marginal product is 
likely to be a positive function of the efficiency of managers not just below but also 
above her. Managers are then reckoned to perceive a gain in stepping over inefficient 
managers located above. Fama (1980) thus reckons that the existence of a managerial 
labour market is a key factor influencing the level of mutual monitoring by managers. 
Alongside this indirect influence, Fama (1980) sees this market as exercising a direct 
pressure on the firm to sort and compensate managers according to their performance 
in order to prevent the best managers from leaving and keep the firm’s attractiveness 
to potentially highly performing managers. 
 
Consistent with the monitoring role of the board of directors, Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) present evidence that poor performance increases the likelihood of top 
management turnover and that corporate boards managerial compensation decisions 
are related to the firm’s performance. 
 
In accordance with Fama’s (1980) assertion that the managerial labour market uses 
information on past performance to set wages and define alternative job opportunities 
for executives, Gilson (1989) analyses the subsequent careers of executives resigning 
from firms that experienced financial distress. He finds that these executives hold 
around one-third fewer seats on the boards of other companies. Also, Kaplan and 
Reishus (1990) report evidence consistent with top executives of dividend-reducing   21
firms being 50% less likely to receive additional directorships than executives of non 
dividend-reducing companies. Cannella, Fraser and Lee (1995) report similar results 
in their study of the careers of executives of failing Texan banks. In addition, they find 
that the labour market distinguishes between managers who lose their prior positions 
for reasons beyond their control and those that were directly involved in the 
institution’s failure. They report that managers associated with banks that fail for 
reasons arguably beyond the managers’ control are twice more likely to regain 
comparable banking posts than managers at other failed banks. 
 
However, the effectiveness of mutual monitoring by managers has been questioned. 
As Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) observe, "imprecise measurement of manager 
efforts (due to bad judgement, moral hazard or poor information) and managerial 
entrenchment limit the effectiveness of the internal assessment mechanism (p. 1539)”. 
Fama (1980) concedes that, at board level, top management may engage in collusive 
arrangements, which might result in the expropriation of security holders’ wealth. 
Consistent with these assertions, Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) present evidence 
of inefficient internal assessment mechanisms over top management. They report that 
only when unfavourable firm performance is extreme do internal mechanisms seem to 
lead to management changes and, even so, the response to bad performance doesn’t 
seem to come without a considerable time lag. Also, Mace (1986) and Lorsh and 
MacIver (1989) find that CEOs tend to dominate the nomination process of new board 
members. 
 
4.4 Security analysts 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that security analysts, employed by investment 
bankers, brokerage houses and large institutional investors, play a monitoring role that 
affects the opportunities available to managers to capture excessive pecuniary and 
non-pecuniarity benefits from the owners of the corporation. This is because of Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) argument that monitoring activities should “become 
specialised to those institutions and individuals who possess comparative advantages 
in these activities (p. 127-128)”. Given that manager’s decisions are closely 
monitored and publicised by these financial analysts, their activities conceivably help 
to discipline managers. Thus, in the absence of such monitoring, managers will be 
more likely to engage in non-value maximising activities, all else constant. 
 
Not all public firms, however, are subject to this potential monitoring force. 
Typically, firms followed by financial analysts tend to be those that are larger and 
whose shares are more liquid and dispersed. Thus, firms that do not meet these 
conditions may have to rely on alternative monitoring mechanisms (either internal or 
external).  
 
Also, Lin and McNichols (1998) present results suggesting that underwriting 
relationships may hamper the potential monitoring role of financial analysts. They 
find that lead and co-underwriter analysts’ forecasts are significantly more favourable 
than those made by unaffiliated analysts although their earnings forecasts are not 
generally greater.  
 
Moyer, Chatfield and Sisneros (1989) find evidence consistent with a monitoring role 
by financial analysts. They document that the level of analysts monitoring activities   23
(proxied by the number of analysts following each firm) is related (after controlling 
for size and other variables) not just to the informational demands of investors but 
also to agency related variables. Additionally, Chung and Jo (1996) present evidence 
that the intensity of analysts’ activities has a positive impact on the market value of 
firms, after controlling for risk, size, R&D, advertising expenditures and profitability. 
They attribute this to a reduction of agency costs effect, although they observe that the 
supply of security analysts’ activities is also partly determined by the marketing 
considerations of brokerage firms. 
 
In the UK, Marston (1997) provides an analysis of the determinants of the number of 
analysts following a firm, although she doesn’t specifically address the agency 
hypothesis that analysts are a source of monitoring. Her results, however, are partly 
consistent with the monitoring role of financial analysts as she finds that the number 
of analysts is negatively associated with insider holdings16. Nonetheless, this could 
also be interpreted as being the result of the demand for analysts’ services being a 
function of the importance of external shareholdings. 
 
4.5 The legal environment 
 
Another external factor that can influence corporate governance is the legal 
environment. This may manifest itself in several ways. One is in the form of 
legislation that directly affects the efficiency, or the cost, of one or more monitoring 
devices. For instance, in the US many States have passed legislation designed to avoid 
                                                           
16 See section 5.3 for the reasons why this result can be seen as consistent with an agency explanation.   24
or increase the costs of hostile takeovers17. This causes a severe impact on the 
existence of the takeover device as a general mechanism to control managerial actions 
within these States. Another example is the existence of legal rules giving a particular 
importance to dividend policy as a potential instrument for dealing with potential 
equity agency problems. This is the case with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece and 
Venezuela, countries where companies face mandatory dividend rules. 
 
In other nations, the role of the legal environment can be somewhat more subtle. In 
the UK, this has taken the form of a number of committees that set up 
recommendations destined to improve corporate governance practices at the board of 
directors’ level. These have been materialised in the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury 
(1995) and Hampel (1998) Reports.  Recommendations emanating from these reports 
have been adopted by the London Stock Exchange in the form of an official 
requirement for listed companies to state the extent of their compliance with these 
recommendations, although the rules formulated by these committees have not been 
made directly compulsory18. 
 
An important insight on the consequences of this kind of state-originated 
recommendations has been given by Dahya, McConnel and Travlos (2002), who 
analyse the relationship between CEO turnover and corporate performance before and 
after the publication of the Cadbury (1992) Code in the UK.  They find that after the 
issuance of the Code, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and 
performance becomes much stronger, with the increase in sensitivity between these 
                                                           
17 See Roe (1993) and Bittlingmayer (2000) for a perspective of the recent history of US antitakeover 
legislation.   25
two variables being concentrated among adopters of Cadbury’s (1992) 
recommendations.  
 
Another important area of the legal environment, which also may influence corporate 
governance devices, is that concerned with the protection of minority shareholders. 
Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that the existence and 
efficiency19 of legal rules protecting investors are a major determinant of the 
development of local capital markets20. If the extent of the corporate governance 
problem is conceivably a deterrent to external capital raising, this can be interpreted 
as suggesting that the quality of the legal system of investor protection is a major 
determinant on the ability of firms and investors to set up appropriate corporate 
governance structures. 
 
Some other aspects of the general legal environment may also lead to consequences 
for corporate governance. For instance, the UK Company Law defines a mandatory 
rights issue requirement (pre-emptive rights) for equity issues21 that can be waived in 
general terms by means of a special resolution approved annually by shareholders22. 
As Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (1998) observe, this requirement affects the 
relative costs of alternative forms of corporate control, providing investors in the UK 
                                                                                                                                                                       
18 For arguments in favour of this UK approach, as opposed to the imposition of statutory rules, see 
Hart (1995). 
19 Viewed in terms of the nature and quality of the rules and their enforcement.  
20 Consistent with this, Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) document that, in a 
sample of 27 wealthy economies, widely held firms are more frequently observed when there is a high 
level of shareholder protection by the legal system.  
21 See section 89(1) of the Companies Act 1985. 
22 In practice, the Investment Committee of the Association of British Insurers and the National 
Association of Pension Funds recommend their institutional shareholders members to approve a 
resolution for an annual disapplication of pre-emptive rights provided that it is restricted to an amount 
of shares that does not exceed 5% of the issued ordinary share capital as shown in the last published 
annual accounts.   26
with the power to impose control changes as part of the condition of the provision of 
new finance. In the US, although similar rights issues requirements are allowed to be 
included in companies’ articles of association, they are not compulsory and seldom 
exist in practice. This in effect may be in part responsible for the different governance 
structures observable in these countries23. 
 
Also consistent with the perspective that the legal environment has a significant 
impact on the structure of corporate governance is Black and Coffee’s (1994) 
comparative study of the legal structures in the US and the UK surrounding 
institutional investors’ behaviour. They observe that the regulation of each type of 
institutional investor is a partial determinant of institutional investors’ willingness to 
be involved in monitoring managerial actions. They also point out that another 
potentially important factor influencing institutional shareholders’ activism is the 
existence of legal barriers to institutional coalition formation. Similarly, Black (1998) 
suggests that some legal rules, namely the 13D filing requirement with the SEC for 
groups of shareholders acting together on a voting issue, are a plausible partial 
explanation for the general lack of shareholder activism by American institutional 
investors. 
 
4.6 The role of reputation 
 
Fama (1980) takes the view that even when a manager’s compensation contract has 
no link whatsoever with shareholder wealth, still the manager may act so as to 
maximise shareholder welfare as a result of the desire to protect her reputation in the 
                                                           
23 See also Miller (1998) for a comparison between US and UK corporate governance structures.    27
labour market.  
 
Holmstrom (1982), however, presents a model where concerns with reputation are not 
sufficient to drive agency costs to zero. Holmstrom and Costa (1986) go even further 
as they suggest that managers’ career concerns may actually lead them to behave 
against shareholders’ interests. 
 
Also, as Garvey and Swan (1994) observe, “a related weakness with the reputational 
story is that it must assume that hiring decisions are always made in the interests of 
shareholders. Reputation-induced distortions are far greater if an executive believes 
her future employers will be Berle-Means firms that are more interested in how much 
her talent will contribute to the utility of incumbent managers rather than their 
shareholders (p 145)”24.  
 
Additionally, the different horizon problem between shareholders and managers (see 
section 2.2) can substantially reduce the potential importance of reputation 
considerations. Consistent with this, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) find evidence of 
misalignment of interests between managers and shareholders when managers 




The preceding sections looked at several external mechanisms that can act as 
disciplining vehicles on managers, encouraging their alignment of interests with 
                                                           
24 This reasoning assumes, however, that external governance mechanisms are inefficient.   28
shareholders.  
 
The first of these is the takeover mechanism. Although this is frequently regarded as a 
highly important disciplining device, it was observed that the free riding problem and 
other takeover costs might limit its efficiency, giving managers some degree of 
freedom to deviate from a value-maximising behaviour. Moreover, in most European 
countries, the specific structure of capital markets and the nature of corporation’s 
ownership mean that this device is in practice a rarely observed one (with the 
exception of the UK). Although the US evidence on this managerial monitoring 
device is generally consistent with its importance in disciplining managers and with 
substitution effects with other disciplining devices, the empirical record in the UK 
does not unequivocally favour the disciplining hypothesis over alternative 
explanations for hostile takeover activity. 
 
In addition, it was noted that the legal environment could directly affect the efficiency 
of disciplining devices. This has been particularly the case with hostile takeovers in 
the US, although some other legal experiments (like some recent ones in the UK) are 
aimed at improving corporate governance practices at the firm level. 
 
Some evidence exists that financial analysts can be an important source of 
monitoring, although this role may be mixed with that of providing information to 
market participants. In many firms, however, their lack of market visibility (namely 
due to a small size or little share dispersion) can diminish the importance of such 
monitoring by financial analysts, thus making other disciplining mechanisms 
potentially more relevant.   29
 
Other general managerial controlling devices that were addressed included product-
market competition, managerial reputation, the labour market for managers and 
mutual monitoring by managers. Although basis for these mechanisms is an intuitive 
one, there is, however, some consensus that these mechanisms are limited in practice 
and usually are important only in some extreme circumstances. For instance, mutual 
monitoring can become important only in extremely negative company performance, 
or product market competition when markets become exceedingly competitive that no 
value-reducing strategies are allowed, etc. Under more normal circumstances, several 
factors make these mechanisms have important limitations in solving the corporate 
governance problem. Such factors include the domination, by the CEO, of 
appointments to the board, managerial collusion, the possibility of managerial 
entrenchment (in its several forms – see section 6), conflicts of interest (e.g., those 
affecting the monitoring role of analysts), and less than perfectly competitive markets.  
 
One is therefore led to the conclusion that, possibly in addition to the external 
disciplining mechanisms analysed above, it is reasonable to infer that corporations 
must rely on other devices adopted (or somehow present) at the firm level, i.e., 
internal disciplining mechanisms. At least some of these could be rightly 
characterised into the Jensen and Meckling (1976) category of bonding mechanisms. 
These internal disciplining devices will be the subject of the following sections. 
 




5.1 Large and institutional shareholders 
   30
 
Large shareholders and institutional investors (Demsetz, 1983, Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985, Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) can be seen as potential controllers of equity agency 
problems as their increased shareholdings can give them a stronger incentive to 
monitor firm performance and managerial behaviour. This potentially helps to 
circumvent the free rider-problem associated with ownership dispersion. Another 
potential benefit relates to the potential challenge that large shareholders offer to 
outside raiders, thus increasing the takeover premium (Burkart, 1995). 
 
Consistent with these benefits, Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Holderness and 
Sheehan (1985) report positive abnormal returns around the announcement of 
outsiders’ acquisition of large equity positions. In the UK, Sudarsanam (1996) looks 
at the relation between block acquisitions and subsequent takeover attempts for the 
target companies and reports that large block acquisitions (between 5% and 30% of 
the target’s shares) not just lead to significant abnormal returns surrounding its 
announcement but also influence the likelihood of takeover bids, hostile bids and the 
success of bids. However, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) cannot find significant 
changes in performance between a sample of firms in which a single shareholder 
owned 50% or more of the shares and another where the ownership just exceeded 
20%. McConnell and Servaes (1990), on the other hand, find a significantly positive 
association between Q and the percentage of shares held by institutional investors, but 
not when block ownership enters the regression as an independent variable.  
 
Several other studies find results suggesting that large shareholders play a role in 
corporate governance. For instance, Shivdasani (1993) reports that the presence of 
large blockholders significantly increases the probability that a firm will be taken   31
over. Also, Denis and Serrano (1996) look at unsuccessful control contests and 
document that management turnover following these is concentrated among poorly 
performing firms where outside blockholders acquire a stake in the company. They 
also report that in the absence of such blockholders, managers tend to retain their 
positions in spite of poor pre-contest performance and the use of value-destroying 
defence tactics during the control contest. In contrast, Pound (1988) reports that in 
proxy contests the probability that management will prevail increases with 
institutional ownership. Possible explanations for this are that institutional investors 
may have other profitable business relationships with the firm or may perceive some 
other reciprocal benefits from co-operation.  
 
The notion that large blockholders help to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers is not uncontested. In this regard, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that 
large shareholders may have incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of 
other outside shareholders.  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that another possible 
cost is that blockholders might forgo some risk diversification gains due to their large 
exposure to a company. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) argue that large shareholdings 
may inhibit the production of information in the market. Burkart (1995) suggests that 
aggressive counter-bidding by incumbent blockholders may actually reduce the 
likelihood of takeover attempts. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) present a model 
where there is a trade-off between the benefits and costs of the presence of large 
shareholders. The costs involved are associated with an ex-ante expropriation threat 
that reduces managerial initiative. The level of ownership concentration is then an 
outcome of a trade-off between these factors. 
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But even if large blockholders are a priori willing to perform a monitoring role, 
several institutional and other constraints may act as inhibiting forces to their 
activism. Black (1998) points out that legal rules, agency costs within the institutions, 
information costs, competition (e.g., between mutual funds), collective action 
problems and limited institutional competence are some of the partial explanations for 
the alleged lack of activism by American institutional investors25. Consistent with 
this view, Wahal (1996) finds no evidence that pension fund activism can compensate 
for an active market for corporate control. 
 
Mallin (1997) presents evidence that UK institutions are less active than their US 
counterparts as they report that their voting levels are markedly below those observed 
in the US. Black and Coffee (1994) provide a general description of the legal and 
institutional environment facing most large shareholders in the UK. They suggest that 
institutional activism is mostly crisis-driven, institutions are usually reluctant to be 
involved in proxy fights, and usually prefer informal, behind-the-scenes interventions 
to formal coalitions. However, they note that the existence of pre-emptive rights for 
new issues embedded in UK’s Company Law provides institutional shareholders with 
an important source of leverage over managers. In contrast with Mallin (1997), Black 
and Coffee (1994) conclude that UK institutions are more involved in corporate 
governance than their US counterparts (partly due to fewer regulatory controls). They 
note, however, that UK institutional activism still faces several constraints. These 
include the costs related to the formation and maintenance of coalitions, little 
incentives for money managers to invest in monitoring, conflicts of interest within the 
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financial institutions. Coffee (1991) contends that the primary reason for institutional investors’ lack of 
activism in the US is not overregulation but insufficient incentives for money managers to engage in 
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same institutional entity (e.g. between its pension fund and merchant banking 
activities) and insider-trading or control-person liability worries.  
 
In spite of the constraints facing blockholders (especially institutional investors), 
Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach (1998) argue that the increasing size of financial 
institutions (usually the most important blockholders) in the most recent decades is an 
important factor encouraging large investors’ greater activism. They argue that a 
larger stake in a company can encourage potential institutional monitors to deviate 
from the more traditional “Wall-Street” or “vote-with-the-feet” rules, whereby 
institutions prefer to sell their stock than to engage in active monitoring26. Consistent 
with this, they find evidence of significant influence of a large institution (TIAA-
CREF) on corporate governance issues through private negotiations. Similarly, Smith 
(1996) also finds evidence of relevant monitoring activism by a large institutional 
investor (CalPERS). Finally, Brickley, Lease and Smith (1994) document increasing 
institutional activism in proxy fights and point out that recent changes in SEC rules 
facilitate the formation of coalitions among investors. 
 
Mallin (1997) observes significant activism by some of the largest UK institutional 
investors (Postel, Prudential and Standard Life) and reports significantly larger voting 
levels by UK’s twenty largest institutional investors than by all institutional investors. 
She also finds that the largest voting levels can be found in insurance companies, 
pension funds and unit trusts. 
 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) find that opposition by institutional shareholders to   34
antitakeover amendments is greatest when proposals reduce stockholders’ wealth. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find evidence that the fraction of shares owned by 
institutions is positively associated with performance (measured by Tobin Q) and that 
institutional ownership reinforces the positive impact of insider ownership on 
performance. In the UK, Short and Keasey (1997) observe no independent effect of 
institutional ownership on performance, but find evidence of a positive interaction 
between insider and institutional ownership in the determination of firm performance.  
All these studies interpret the above evidence as consistent with the assertion that 
institutions exert a monitoring role over managers.  
 
5.2 Board of directors 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) characterise the responsibilities of the board of directors as 
being both the ratification of management decisions and the monitoring of 
management performance. This means that the likelihood of managerial collusion 
(Fama, 1980) may be reduced by the presence of outside directors, who may thus be 
regarded as another potential source of corporate monitoring (Winter, 1977, Fama, 
1980 and Weisbach, 1988). These are ideally regarded as professional referees who 
have the task of overseeing the competition between top managers and are disciplined 
themselves by an external labour market which judges and prices their services 
according to their performance as referees. Critics of the efficiency of this monitoring 
mechanism point out that managers inherently dominate the board by choosing 
outside directors and providing the information they analyse (Mace, 1986). The 
question is thus ultimately an empirical one. 
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Against the hypothesis that board composition is a relevant source of monitoring, 
Bhagat and Black (1997) find no evidence that the proportion of outside directors 
affects future firm performance. This is, however, a notably weak test for the 
hypothesis that board composition is a source of corporate monitoring given that, 
following, for instance, Demsetz (1983), different monitoring mechanisms may be 
used in an optimal way, in which case no relation between these and performance 
would be observed. 
 
Consistent, however, with the importance of external directors as monitors, Weisbach 
(1988) documents that CEOs of poorly performing firms are more likely to be 
replaced if the firm has a majority of outside directors. However, Dahya, Lonie and 
Power (1998) show that the probability of removal of a senior executive from office is 
negatively associated with his equity stake.  
 
Similarly, Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996) find a positive relation between 
the percentage of outside directors and the likelihood that an outsider is appointed as 
CEO.  
 
Also consistent with the monitoring importance of outside directors, Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) report abnormal increases in firm value after the appointment of 
additional outside directors. Also, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find that following 
a period of weak performance, firms tend to increase the number of appointments of 
outside directors relative to insiders.  
 
Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994) document a positive stock price reaction to the 
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adoption of poison pills when boards are dominated by outside directors, and a 
negative one when outside directors are a minority. Byrd and Hickman (1992) show 
that the share market response to bidding companies that announce tender offers is 
more favourable when boards include independent directors.  
 
Cotter, Shivadsani and Zenner (1997) analyse the role of target firm’s independent 
outside directors during takeover attempts. They find that boards with a majority of 
independent directors are more likely to use resistance strategies that enhance 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
In the UK, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) find no significant association between 
performance and board structure. However, Dahya, McConnel and Travlos (2002) 
point out that the increase in sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance which they 
observe for companies complying with the Cadbury (1992) code can be traced to the 
presence of more external directors in the board of those companies, precisely one of 
Cadbury’s (1992) major recommendations. Their results are therefore consistent with 
an increase in board monitoring activity in those firms, but they provide no evidence 
on whether such increase in sensitivity of turnover to performance is subsequently 
followed by better performance in those firms. 
 
5.3 Insider ownership 
 
One rather intuitive way by which equity agency costs can be reduced is by increasing 
the level of managers’ stock ownership, which may permit a better alignment of their 
interests with those of shareholders. In fact, in the extreme case where the manager’s 
share ownership is 100%, equity agency costs are reduced to zero (Jensen and   37
Meckling, 1976). As managerial ownership increases, managers bear a large fraction 
of the costs of shirking, perquisite consumption and other value-destroying actions. 
Further, larger share ownership by managers reduces the problem of different 
horizons between shareholders and managers if share prices adjust rapidly to changes 
in firm’s intrinsic value. 
 
A limitation, however, of this mechanism as a tool for reducing agency costs is that 
managers may not be willing to increase their ownership of the firm because of 
constraints on their personal wealth. Additionally, personal risk aversion also limits 
the extension of this monitoring device as the allocation of a large portion of the 
manager’s wealth to a single firm is likely to translate into a badly diversified 
portfolio (Beck and Zorn, 1982). 
  
Management buyouts, whereby insiders increase dramatically their shareholdings in 
the firm, provide a natural field study for the effects of insider ownership in the 
reduction of conflicts between owners and managers. In accordance with the 
proposition that larger managerial ownership reduce agency costs, Kaplan (1989) 
finds that following large management buyouts, firms experience significant 
improvements in operating performance. He interprets this evidence as suggesting that 
operating changes were due to improved management incentives instead of layoffs or 
managerial exploitation of shareholders through inside information. Smith (1990) 
reports similar results and notes that the amelioration observed in operating 
performance is not due to reductions in discretionary expenditures such as research 
and development, advertising, maintenance or property, plant and equipment.  
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In a study of the effects of changes in ownership structure on performance for a 
sample of thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership, Cole and 
Mehran (1998) find that changes in performance are significantly associated with 
changes in insider ownership. They document that the greater the increase in insider 
ownership, the greater the performance improvement, which is consistent with the 
alignment of interests hypothesis arising from a larger insider ownership. Also 
consistent with that hypothesis, Subrahmanyam, Rangan and Rosenstein (1997) find 
evidence, in a sample of successful bidders in bank acquisitions, of a positive 
association between bidder returns and the level of insider ownership when the latter 
exceeds 6%. 
 
Research by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) is also consistent with the view that insider ownership 
can be an effective tool in reducing agency costs, although they report a non-
monotonic relation. This functional form has been related to the observation that, 
within a certain ownership range, managers may use their equity position to entrench 
themselves against any disciplining attempts from other monitoring mechanisms (see 
section 6).  
 
However, some other studies find no evidence of a positive relationship between 
insider ownership and performance (see, for instance, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, 
Loderer and Sheehan, 1989, Holderness and Sheehan, 1988, Denis and Denis, 1994, 
and Loderer and Martin, 1997). Moreover, the studies that find a positive relationship 
typically present results that have very low explanatory power (R
2s usually between 
2% and 6%).    39
 
A possible explanation for these mixed results is that many of the studies do not 
properly distinguish the possibility of alignment of interests across a certain range of 
ownership values and of entrenchment over another range (see section 6). 
Furthermore, these analyses usually do not take into account the possibility that 
several different mechanisms for alignment of interests can be used simultaneously, 
with substitution effects with insider ownership. It is quite conceivable that different 
firms may use different mixes of corporate governance devices (Rediker and Seth, 
1995). These different mixes can, however, all be optimal as a result of varying 
marginal costs and benefits of the several monitoring instruments available for each 
firm. If so, then one would not be able to observe a relationship between performance 
and any of these particular mechanisms.  
 
 
5.4 Compensation packages 
 
A different type of monitoring vehicle is related to the potential links between 
managerial compensation and firm performance. In theory, a strong relation between 
compensation and firm performance would enable a better alignment of interests 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Relevant elements 
of the compensation package typically include stock related rewards, deferred cash 
compensation and dividend policy-dependent compensation.  
 
Evidence of such a significant link is, however, not strong. Lewellen, Loderer and 
Martin (1987), for example, find evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
compensation packages are designed to reduce agency costs. However, a 
comprehensive analysis of CEO pay in the US by Jensen and Murphy (1990)   40
concludes that most compensation contracts are characterised by a general absence of 
real management incentives and that observed compensation patterns are inconsistent 
with the implications of formal agency models of optimal contracting. Similarly, 
Yermack (1995) reports that observed stock options performance incentives have no 
significant association with explanatory variables related to agency costs reduction. In 
the UK, Gregg, Machin and Szymansky (1993) reach similar conclusions as they find 
a very weak relation between pay and performance for the period 1983-88 and no 
relation after that. They observe however, a strong association between pay and asset 
growth. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the empirically 
observed lack of sensitivity of pay to performance is caused by legal and political 
external factors common to many countries. In addition, Haubrich (1994) shows that 
it may not be optimal to include a large sensitivity of pay to performance in 
managers’ compensation contracts as this would require a large risk tolerance from 
the part of managers, which is not an efficient incentive system for more risk-averse 
managers. 
 
Furthermore, Yermack (1997) documents that managers can time stock options to 
their advantage as he finds that stock options are granted just before the 
announcement of good news and tend to be delayed until after bad announcements.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) view the overall evidence on the relationship between pay 
and performance as suggesting that it is “problematic to argue that incentive contracts 
completely solve the agency problem (p. 745)”.    41
 
5.5 Debt policy 
 
Debt was rationalised by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a vehicle for reducing 
agency problems in several ways. One is that using more debt reduces total equity 
financing and the need for external equity to be issued in the first place by the initial 
owner-manager, thus diminishing the scope of the manager-shareholder conflict. In 
other words, the issue of debt instead of equity facilitates an increase in managerial 
ownership and therefore a greater alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders. 
 
Additionally, debt can represent a bonding commitment by the manager to pay out 
cash-flows to debtholders thus helping to overcome the free cash-flow problem 
(Jensen, 1986). Stulz (1988) shows that leverage limits management discretion and 
hence reduces the agency costs of managerial non-value maximisation behaviour.  
 
Also, increased debt imposes on management a higher threat of bankruptcy as a 
penalty for defaulting on debt interest or principal repayments. This threat brings 
potentially serious consequences for management, as a result of potential loss of 
reputation or dismissal, and is therefore likely to encourage efficiency. 
 
On the other hand, debt frequently possesses a tax advantage as corporations receive 
tax deductions from interest payments made to debtholders27. Another potential 
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benefit of debt is related to Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument that debt may reduce 
information asymmetry problems about firm value associated with equity financing. 
 
However, leverage also brings its own agency problems arising from conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and debtholders. Such conflicts include those which 
result from the incentive for equityholders to invest suboptimally either by investing 
in high-risk assets or underinvesting in new profitable projects (Myers, 1977). Debt is 
therefore the source of what is called debt agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
characterise debt agency costs as consisting of (i) the opportunity wealth loss caused 
by the impact of debt on the investment decisions of the firm, (ii) monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by debtholders and the firm, and (iii) bankruptcy and 
reorganisation costs. Debtholders compensate themselves for these agency costs by 
charging higher interest rates, thus increasing the cost of debt. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Smith and Watts (1992) report extensive evidence consistent with 
significant debt agency costs.  
 
Besides creating its own agency costs, debt can reduce a firm’s resilience because 
interest payments are inflexible and this inflexibility may lead to suboptimal 
managerial risk taking. The cost and use of debt as a managerial monitoring 
mechanism are likely to vary among firms according to size, level of tangible assets 
that may be collateralised, firm reputation, business risk, and ownership structure. For 
many firms, especially those with volatile profits or few tangible assets, maintaining a 
significant level of debt may be very impractical, and moderate levels of debt may not 
translate into a sufficient bonding commitment to discipline managers. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                                       
debt’s interest tax shields, but is in accordance with previous results by Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
that did ignore these.   43
debtholders frequently may be reluctant to exercise their right to file for their debtor’s 
bankruptcy and may prefer out of the court reorganisations, especially if they have 
high financial stakes at risk (Ghoshen, 1995). This may also compromise the bonding 
commitment of debt.  
 
Thus, in terms of its managerial disciplining role, debt can perhaps best be seen as 
setting a minimum performance requirement on management, above which managers 
may deviate from optimality with some degree of impunity. This means that debt can 
assume the role of an important disciplining mechanism only if the threshold for 
managers is high enough and the associated bankruptcy risk is perceived as 
sufficiently important or credible. In addition, these equity agency cost reduction 
benefits (along with tax advantages) have to be balanced against debt agency and 
other, non-agency, costs referred above. Thus, notwithstanding the importance of debt 
in many contexts, it may be optimal for a particular firm to rely less on debt and more 
on alternative monitoring mechanisms. 
 
Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a survey on the theory and empirical evidence of the 
use of debt to mitigate equity agency costs. They conclude that, in general, the 
evidence is supportive of the proposition that debt can reduce equity agency costs. 
Megginson (1997) reaches similar conclusions. McConnell and Servaes (1995) 
present results consistent with Stulz’s (1990) hypothesis that, because of its influence 
on corporate investment decisions, debt may have a positive or a negative effect on 
firm value. They document that the latter effect dominates the former one in firms 
with many profitable growth opportunities. This is in general agreement with the use 
of debt to reduce agency costs being variant across firms and dependent on company-  44
specific characteristics. 
 
In accordance with the proposition that debt plays a role in dealing with equity agency 
costs, Garvey and Hanka (1999) document that firms that become protected by state 
antitakeover laws substantially reduce their usage of debt, while those without such 
protection do the opposite. Similarly, Safieddine and Titman (1999) present results 
consistent with the use of debt being positively associated with an alignment of 
interests between shareholders and managers as they report that targets of failed 
takeovers that subsequently increased their leverage ratios tend to experience 
significantly better performance than those that do not. 
 
5.6 Dividend policy 
 
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), among others, provide the rationale for a 
monitoring role of dividends. According to Easterbrook (1984), dividends may 
control equity agency problems by facilitating primary capital market monitoring of 
the firm’s activities and performance. The reason is that higher dividend payouts 
increase the likelihood that the firm will have to sell common stock in primary capital 
markets. This in turn leads to an investigation of management by investment banks, 
securities exchanges and capital suppliers. Studies by Smith (1986), Hansen and 
Torregrosa (1992) and Jain and Kini (1999) have recognised the importance of 
monitoring by investment bankers in new equity issues. Recent theoretical work by 
Fluck (1998), and Myers (2000) also presents agency-theoretic models of dividend 
behaviour where managers pay dividends in order to avoid disciplining action by   45
shareholders. In Myers’ (2000) model, outside equity only works if sufficient 
dividends are paid. 
 
Additionally, Jensen (1986) sees expected, continuing dividend payments as helping 
to dissipate cash which might otherwise have been wasted in non-value maximising 
projects, therefore reducing the extent of overinvestment by managers.  
 
In Rozeff’s (1982) model, an optimal dividend policy is the outcome of a trade-off 
between equity agency costs and transaction costs. Consistent with such trade-off 
model, Rozeff reports evidence of a strong relationship between dividend payouts and 
a set of variables proxying for agency and transaction costs in a large sample 
composed of one thousand US firms for the period 1974 to 1980.  
 
A cross-sectional analysis of dividend policy by Crutchley and Hansen (1989) also 
shows results consistent with dividend policy acting as a corporate monitoring vehicle 
and with substitution effects between dividend payments and two other control 
mechanisms, managerial ownership and leverage.  
 
Also in accordance with an agency view of dividends, Farinha (2003) shows that 
dividend payouts in the UK have a U-shaped relationship with ownership by insiders 
with a critical turning point close to 30% of insider ownership. This agrees with the 
notion that up to a critical entrenchment level dividends and insider ownership are 
substitute vehicles for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, but after 
such level increasing ownership by managers will create further, entrenchment-related 
agency problems that induce the need for larger dividend payouts as a compensating   46
factor. Such result is particularly interesting since the prediction of a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and dividends is unique to the agency 
perspective, unlike most other results reported in the literature on dividend policy 
which are usually also in accordance with competing signalling or tax-based stories,. 
 
Broadly speaking, there is a rising degree of consensus that dividend policy as a role 
to play in managerial monitoring. Megginson (1997) refers to this under the terms that 
“the agency costs-contracting model of dividends represents the mainstream of 




The sections above suggested that several internal governance mechanisms are 
available for firms to reduce equity agency problems. It was noted that large 
shareholders can be an important potential monitoring device as large stakes can 
compensate for the free riding problem associated with small shareholders’ lack of 
motivation for engaging in monitoring. However, large institutions’ disciplining 
actions might be severely limited in practice because of, among other factors, legal 
constraints, internal agency problems, conflicts of interest, and competition between 
institutions. The empirical record is, nonetheless, usually consistent with large 
shareholders being associated with an increased probability of takeover, larger 
management turnover and better performance, although some mixed results have 
emerged. Monitoring actions also seem to be more intense with some particularly 
large US and UK institutional investors. The level of activism can be dependent, 
however, on the type of institution as a result of the specific legal and other constraints   47
facing each category, with some studies suggesting that insurers, pension funds and 
unit trusts can be the most active institutions. Other evidence also suggests the 
possibility of positive interactions between insider and institutional ownership in the 
determination of performance. 
 
The board of directors has also been analysed as a potential device for controlling 
equity agency problems. Some evidence has been reported which is consistent with 
the value relevance of the appointment of outside directors and also with the 
importance of outsiders in the context of the adoption of takeover defences and 
acquisitions. The evidence on the effect of outside directors on firm performance is, 
however, mixed calling for more research on the effect of this potential corporate 
monitoring device on firm performance. However, there are some recent encouraging 
results like those of Dahya, McConnel and Travlos (2002) pointing out that the 
emergence of Cadbury (1992) -type sets of state-backed recommendations may have 
important consequences on the quality of corporate governance at the board level. 
 
Another important managerial monitoring vehicle that has been the subject of 
numerous studies is that of insider ownership. Consistent with such a role, many 
studies are supportive of insider ownership being an important determinant of 
performance and positively affecting the likelihood of better acquisitions. Some other 
studies find, however, no evidence of links between insider ownership and 
performance. These mixed results can be attributed to the possibility of managerial 
entrenchment, and similarly to problems that can be encountered in the analysis of 
other single monitoring mechanisms, to the possibility that firms can rely on a bundle 
of disciplining devices (that can be either substitute or complementary ones).   48
 
Compensation packages have also been addressed in the literature given that potential 
links between pay and performance can help align the interests of managers and 
shareholders, although a strong link can in theory be non-optimal because of 
managers’ risk aversion. The evidence, however, suggest that the sensitivity of pay to 
performance is typically a poor one and that asset size is a much more significant 
determinant of compensation. In addition, managers seem to time the granting of stock 
options to their advantage. 
 
Finally, debt and dividend policies have also been seen as additional potential internal 
devices to reduce equity agency costs. Although some evidence suggests that debt 
fulfils that role, the usage of debt for such purpose can be limited in practice for 
several reasons. These are that debt can create its own agency problems, increase the 
threat of bankruptcy, reduce firm’s resilience and be constrained by, among other 
factors, the level of tangible assets, business risk, and firm reputation. In contrast, a 
growing consensus exists regarding a managerial monitoring role for dividend policy 
where recent empirical results have been taking away the focus from signalling or tax-
based as the main explanations for corporate dividends. 
 
A general conclusion that emerges from the analysis of these potential instruments is 
that each cannot be universally adopted by any firm in the same manner. This is 
essentially because these devices have limitations, marginal costs and marginal 
benefits that, most likely, are not identical across firms (or industries). As a result, one 
might expect that firms would rather rely on mixes of such monitoring mechanisms, 
and interactions among these are also a strong possibility that should not be ruled out.   49
 
 
6 Managerial entrenchment 
 
 
6.1 The entrenchment hypothesis 
 
 
Since Berle and Means (1932) and, more recently, Jensen and Meckling (1976), it is 
widely agreed that when managers hold little equity and shareholders are too 
dispersed to take action against non-value maximisation behaviour, agency problems 
arise. With little or no holdings in the firm, insiders may deploy corporate assets to 
obtain personal benefits, such as shirking, perquisite consumption and the pursuit of 
wealth-reducing investments (see section 3). Thus, as insider ownership increases, 
agency costs may be reduced since managers bear a larger share of these costs.  
 
However, as Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983), among others, point out, 
managers holding a substantial portion of a firm’s equity may have enough voting 
power to ensure that their position inside the company is secure. As a result, they may 
become to a great extent insulated from external disciplining forces such as the 
takeover threat or the managerial labour market. Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) 
define entrenchment as “the extent to which managers fail to experience discipline 
from the full range of corporate governance and control mechanisms (p. 1411)”. 
 
Along these lines, Stulz (1988) presents a model where high ownership by managers 
and the associated large voting power leads to managers being more likely to become 
entrenched in their positions inside the firm. This means that moderately high levels 
of stock ownership can aggravate, not diminish, conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. This entrenchment can effectively preclude the possibility of a takeover,   50
but also may imply diminished monitoring effectiveness of the other external 
disciplining devices (like product and factor markets) and the various internal 
governance mechanisms. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) also develop a model whereby managers are able to 
entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments that increase their value 
to shareholders. A consequence of these investments is that managers can reduce the 
likelihood of replacement and are able to extract higher salaries and larger perquisites 
from shareholders, as well as getting more discretion in determining corporate 
strategy. 
 
6.2 Evidence on managerial entrenchment 
 
Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, Weston (1979) reports that firms where 
insiders held more than 30% have never been acquired in hostile takeovers. Also, 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find non-
monotonic relationships between insider ownership and firm performance in 
accordance with a managerial entrenchment view.  
 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) estimate a piecewise linear regression where the 
dependent variable is Tobin Q and the primary explanatory variable is insider 
ownership. They find that Tobin Q first rises from 0% to 5% of insider ownership, 
then falls as insider ownership increases to 25%, then rises again slightly at higher 
ownership stakes. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) interpret these findings as 
consistent with an alignment of interests when insider ownership increases from 0% 
to 5% and with an entrenchment hypothesis when ownership increases beyond the 5%   51
threshold. At larger insider ownership levels then interest alignment becomes once 
again important.  
 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) expand Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s (1988) results 
by regressing Tobin Q against various measures of ownership which account for the 
stakes in the firm held not just by insiders but also individual atomistic shareholders, 
blockholders and institutional investors. Using a quadratic specification for insider 
ownership, McConnell and Servaes (1990) find an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between Tobin Q and insider ownership where Q is maximised at a 37.6% level of 
insider ownership in 1976 and 49.4% in 1986.  
 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) model the relation between performance, board 
composition and insider ownership, allowing for the endogenous determination of 
insider ownership and board composition. Their results are generally consistent with 
those of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). In 
the UK, Short and Keasey (1999) also find evidence in accordance with entrenchment 
when analysing the relationship between performance (measured by an approximation 
to Tobin Q or return on equity) and insider ownership. They document a positive 
association at low levels of ownership, followed by a negative relation (roughly 
between 10% and 40% insider ownership), and then a positive one again at higher 
levels of insider holdings. This is consistent with an alignment of interests between 
insiders and shareholders being dominant at the lowest and highest levels of insider 
ownership, while entrenchment effects become preponderant in the middle range. 
 
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997b) model the probability of top management turnover as   52
a function of ownership structure. Consistent with managerial entrenchment, they find 
that the likelihood of top management turnover is significantly greater in poorly 
performing firms with low managerial ownership than in poorly performing firms 
with higher managerial ownership. They conclude that larger equity ownership by 
managers insulates them from internal monitoring efforts. Consistent with this, 
Dahya, Lonie and Power (1998) find UK evidence that forced departures of CEOs 
tend to occur only when the top manager has less than 1% of the firm’s capital and 
that, as the level of ownership increases, managers become increasingly entrenched in 
their positions. 
 
In the context of capital structure policy, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) note that 
managers may have a preference for lower than optimal debt so as to reduce firm risk 
and protect their personal, under-diversified, firm-related, wealth (Fama, 1980) or to 
avoid disgorging free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, managers may 
wish to increase debt so as to inflate their voting power and reduce the likelihood of 
takeovers. In their empirical analysis, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) document 
that leverage decisions are related to the level of entrenchment by managers, and that, 
in general, entrenched managers try to avoid debt. They observe that leverage tends to 
be lower when the CEO has a longer tenure, low stock and compensation incentives 
and has little monitoring from the board of directors or major shareholders. To test if 
the observed relationships are causal ones, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) look at 
the aftermath of entrenchment-reducing events and report that leverage tends, as 
expected, to increase after those events. 
 
Consistent with managerial entrenchment (but also with signalling), Vafeas (1997)   53
finds support for the argument that stock repurchases serve to entrench managers by 
increasing the percentage of managerial ownership. He finds evidence that firms are 
more likely to use self-tender offers when pre-buyback insider ownership is high and 
when the post-buyback ownership shift is greatest.  
 
Also in accordance with a managerial entrenchment hypothesis, Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2003), using UK data, find that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and the percentage of outsiders on the board of directors is U-shaped. They 
estimate that the turning point of that relationship (or entrenchment level) is around 
40% but that the U-shaped association is mainly confined to larger firms. 
 
McNabb and Martin (1998), on the other hand, examine the efficiency of internal 
governance mechanisms in the case of highly entrenched managers (the founder 
CEOs). They find that the existence of such entrenchment is a deterrent to an 
improvement in performance and that shareholders typically receive substantial 
wealth gains when the founder leaves both the firm and the board. 
 
Another potential instrument for managerial entrenchment is that of Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), through which managers can have voting rights without 
the corresponding cash-flow rights.  
 
Consistent with the use of ESOPs by management as an entrenchment tool, Gordon 
and Pound (1990) find that ESOPs established during takeover activity reduce share 
values by an average of approximately 4%. They also report that ESOPs reduce share 
values if they are structured to transfer control away from outside shareholders by   54
creating a new ownership block with veto power over takeover bids. However, when 
ESOPs are established with nonvoting stock, so as to preclude any immediate control 
transfers, the consequence is a significant increase in share values.  
 
Chang and Mayers (1992) also examine the value impact of ESOP announcements 
and observe that shareholders benefit the most when insiders initially control between 
10% and 20% of the outstanding votes. When, however, directors and officers control 
40% or more of the outstanding shares, a negative association is found between 
announcement abnormal returns and the fraction of shares contributed to the ESOP. 
The incremental benefits are thus small (but positive) for low ownership levels and 
negative for high levels of insider control. These results are, like those of Gordon and 
Pound (1989), consistent with the usage of ESOPs by insiders for entrenchment 
purposes when these have already substantial voting rights. In a sample of thrift 
institutions converting from mutual to stock ownership, Cole and Mehran (1998) find 
that improvements in performance are negatively associated with changes in 
ownership by ESOPs, “consistent with the view that ESOPs are often used to impede 
takeovers (p. 293)”. 
 
A different potential tool for entrenchment is that of dual-class recapitalisations. These 
are plans that restructure the equity of a firm into two types of shares with different 
voting rights. Similar to the use of ESOPs, dual-class shares provide management (or 
family owners) with a voting power that is disproportionately greater than that under a 
“one-share, one vote” rule.  
 
In theory, dual-class recapitalisations can be beneficial if these allow management to   55
extract a higher bid in a takeover (the optimal contracting hypothesis), or harmful if 
these insulate managers from the external market for corporate control (the 
management entrenchment hypothesis). Therefore, once again, the issue is an 
empirical one. In this regard, the evidence is mixed. Partch (1987) reports non-
negative price effects around the announcement of dual-class recapitalisations for 44 
firms. Moyer, Rao and Sisneros (1992) look at changes in firms and external 
monitoring forces following dual-class recapitalisations. They document that 
alternative monitoring mechanisms do emerge following such events and conclude 
that dual-class recapitalisations are undertaken with the purpose of increasing 
managerial efficiency and protecting shareholders from undervalued takeover bids. In 
contrast, Jarrel and Poulsen (1988b) find significant negative effects for companies 
that create dual-class shares and take the view that these actions increase managers’ 
ability to insulate themselves from the discipline of hostile takeovers. Bacon, Cornett 
and Davidson, III (1997) analyse the characteristics of the board of directors of firms 
announcing dual-class recapitalisations but find no clear evidence in support of either 
the management-entrenchment or the optimal-contracting hypotheses. They concede, 
however, that “some firms in the sample may be pursuing shareholder-wealth 
maximisation, while others may be pursuing management entrenchment (p. 20)”. 
They show that some of the characteristics that may be associated with these different 
objectives are the level of insider ownership (which impacts positively on abnormal 
returns at the announcement), the tenure of the insiders on the board (with a negative 
influence) and the existence of staggered board elections (with a positive impact). 
 
Other potentially entrenching actions that have been analysed in the literature include 
several other anti-takeover devices such as   56
-  supermajority amendments (through which a large majority of votes is required to 
approve  mergers or other important transactions, or a “fair” price for such 
transactions); 
-  poison pills (a legal device usually triggered in the event of a hostile takeover bid 
which provides target shareholders with the right to buy or sell company shares at 
very attractive prices, thus increasing the cost of a takeover); 
-  greenmail (or targeted block stock repurchases), by which the management of the 
target firm ends an hostile takeover threat by repurchasing at a premium the stock 
held by the bidder (or potential bidder); and 
-  white knight intervention, whereby management calls upon a friendly investor to 
intervene in a takeover battle by entering a new bid in the contest. 
 
The evidence on the effects of such defensive actions is usually consistent with 
significant negative impacts on the share prices of firms undertaking them (see Jensen 





Managerial entrenchment was defined as a situation where managers experience some 
degree of insulation from disciplining mechanisms. Several situations giving rise to 
managerial entrenchment were analysed, which included high levels of insider 
ownership, manager-specific investments, ESOPs, dual class share recapitalisations 
and several anti-takeover devices. 
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The empirical evidence surveyed is consistent with several observations, all of which 
consistent with the relevance of managerial entrenchment. One is that above a certain 
level of ownership, increased managerial holdings on a firm can have a negative 
impact on performance. Others are that high managerial ownership is associated with 
a lower probability of management turnover, lower levels of debt and a larger 
percentage of outsiders on the board (in large firms). Also, turnover by founders leads 
to positive abnormal returns. 
 
Also consistent with the hypothesis of managerial entrenchment is the evidence on the 
creation of ESOPs, dual class recapitalisations and anti-takeover mechanisms. 
Typically, in situations where the creation of these devices is particularly prone to 
cause entrenchment, there is usually an adverse impact on stock prices. 
 
A consequence of these results is that an analysis of the impact of the adoption of any 
of the management disciplining mechanisms described in the precedent sections must 
necessarily take into consideration the possible existence of entrenchment effects. 
This entrenchment can be caused by a number of potential devices, the most important 
of which being probably the control of voting rights, either directly through their 
personal holdings, or indirectly through dual class-shares and other stakes where 
voting rights are disproportionate to cash-flow rights. This is because the presence of 
entrenchment can neutralise or alter the marginal impact or one or several monitoring 
mechanisms and thus potentially lead to wrong inferences about the individual 
properties of these disciplining devices. Also, given the close links between the notion 
of equity agency problems and the issue of managerial entrenchment, the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis offers an important basis for testing the agency explanation   58
for the cross-sectional variation of a particular potential managerial monitoring 
device. 
 
7 The link between corporate governance and firm value 
 
Following the renewed media interest in corporate governance after major accounting 
scandals and large-scale corporate failures, there has been a growing interest in 
creating corporate governance indices28 and finding an empirical link between these 
and firm value.  On this last issue, Gompers, Ichii and Metrick (2003) find a 
significant association between a corporate governance index built from 24 provisions 
and stock returns. They reckon that an investment strategy where investors buy firms 
with the highest ranks in such index would yield substantial abnormal returns of 8.5%. 
They also observe that firms with weaker governance measures have generally lower 
accounting-based performance measures, lower Tobin Qs, and are engaged more 
actively in acquisitions and capital investments. Along the same lines, Black (2001), 
using a small sample of Russian firms, finds a similar relation as he observes that a 
change in corporate governance scores from the lowest to the highest rank 
significantly increases firm market value.  
 
This particular research is of course still in its early stages. Apart from the problems in 
defining consensual measures of firm performance (and indeed also of corporate 
governance indexes) and correctly controlling for all non-corporate governance 
related factors, which most certainly will underline future research in this, a problem 
                                                           
28 Some recent attempts to produce commercial providers of corporate governance indices include 
those of Standard & Poor’s Corporate Governance Scores and Governance Metrics International. 
Attempts, however, have also taken place in the not-for-profit sector like the joint launching of the 
Japan Corporate Governance Index Research Group by the Universities of Tokyo and Hitotsubashi.   59
to be solved lies on the possibility of inverse causality. Specifically, one may argue 
that performance may drive to a certain extent a stronger compliance with corporate 
governance provisions. Therefore, similar to the analysis of the determination of the 
set of corporate governance devices for a particular firm, once again we may find that 
a correct specification of the corporate governance problem in the context of 
performance analysis may have to take endogeneity in consideration. 
 
8 Summary and conclusions  
 
This paper analysed the concept of corporate governance, the theoretical reasons for 
the corporate governance problem and the evidence on the existence of unsolved 
agency problems in corporations. Some major conclusions were that residual agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) are significant and that mechanisms for controlling 
the dimension of these agency costs are available and include external and internal 
disciplining devices. It was observed that due to important theoretical and practical 
limitations, external disciplining devices including takeover threat, the managerial 
labour market, mutual monitoring by managers, reputation, competition in product-
factor markets and financial analysts cannot alone solve the corporate governance 
problem, although they may be important in some particular circumstances. Firms 
therefore have to adopt complementary internal disciplining devices in order to 
minimise their total agency costs. These internal devices include the composition of 
the board of directors, insider ownership, large shareholders, compensation packages 
and financial policies (dividends and debt). It was also observed that these monitoring 
devices may carry benefits but also costs, and are not unlimited in their effectiveness 
at reducing agency costs. Moreover, their marginal benefits and costs are likely to   60
vary across firms or industries, making it likely that firms may choose different mixes 
of monitoring mechanisms according to their own specific characteristics. Finally, it 
was noted that managers can, to some degree, insulate themselves from many of these 
monitoring mechanisms by controlling voting rights (with or without proportionate 
cash-flow rights), manager-specific investments or antitakeover devices. This 
possibility should be taken into consideration (alongside the notion that firms are 
likely to adopt bundles of management controlling mechanisms) when modelling the 
analysis of a particular monitoring device or interactions between different 
disciplining mechanisms. In accordance with this, an increasing number of studies 
have been recognising the simultaneous (or interactive) nature of many of the 
corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting that single-handed interventions on a 
particular mechanism may not be feasible or effective. Along the same lines, a 
promising area for future research is the link between the corporate governance 
characteristics of firms and performance. After some encouraging exploratory results, 
many empirical issues will have to be addressed before one can draw strong 
conclusions, in particular the question of the potential endogeneity of both the 
corporate governance characteristics of firms and their performance.   61
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